Does Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Create Shareholder Value? Evidence from the Indian Companies Act 2013
利用印度2013年强制企业将净利润2%用于CSR的法律，通过事件研究和断点回归发现该法平均导致受影响公司股价下跌4.1%，但广告支出高的公司未受负面影响，表明强制CSR可能损害股东价值。
ABSTRACT In 2013, a new law required Indian firms, which satisfy certain profitability, net worth, and size thresholds, to spend at least 2% of their net income on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We exploit this regulatory change to isolate the shareholder value implications of CSR activities. Using an event study approach coupled with a regression discontinuity design, we find that the law, on average, caused a 4.1% drop in the stock price of firms forced to spend money on CSR. However, firms that spend more on advertising are not negatively affected by the mandatory CSR rule. These results suggest that firms voluntarily choose CSR to maximize shareholder value. Therefore, forcing a firm to spend on CSR is likely to be sub‐optimal for the firm with a consequent negative impact on shareholder value.