REPUTATION TRANSMISSION WITHOUT BENEFIT TO THE REPORTER: A BEHAVIORAL UNDERPINNING OF MARKETS IN EXPERIMENTAL FOCUS
实验发现许多合作者会自费报告背叛者的行为，即使自己无利可图，但能阻止背叛者未来获利并帮助其下一个伙伴，揭示了社会偏好和情绪在声誉传递中的作用。
Reputation is a commonly cited check on opportunism, but it is often unclear what motivates an agent to report another's behavior when it is easy for the aggrieved individual to move on. In a sharply focused laboratory experiment, we find that many cooperators pay to report a defecting partner without the possibility of pecuniary benefit when this has the potential to deprive the latter of future gains and to help his next partner. We illustrate how a social preference can explain such costly reporting, and also discuss evidence for a role of emotions.