Self-Interested Routing in Queueing Networks
研究随机网络中自利路由对系统稳定性的影响，发现某些调度规则下纳什均衡会导致网络不稳定，并设计了一种调度规则来消除自利路由的性能损失，使纳什均衡接近最优解。
We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from self-interested routing and achieves a Nash equilibrium with performance comparable to the first-best solution.