Bank Competition: Measurement, Decision‐Making, and Risk‐Taking
利用基于文本的新竞争度量指标和银行放松管制的外生变化，发现竞争加剧会降低贷款标准、延迟损失确认并转向非利息收入，从而增加单个银行风险和系统性风险贡献。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.