Prices and the Winner's Curse
发现，在共同价值资产销售中，增加供给、配给分配和排除潜在买家反而会提高预期价格，并解释了首次公开募股中的配给和频谱拍卖结果。
We usually assume that increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers reduce prices. But all these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these "anomalies" for symmetric buyers, small asymmetries among the buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear. Our results help explain rationing in initial public offerings and outcomes of spectrum auctions. We illustrate our results in the "Wallet Game" and in another new game we introduce, the "Maximum Game."