Timing of Auctions of Real Options
研究了拍卖时机如何内生于实物期权拍卖中，发现卖方会延迟拍卖以鼓励竞拍者参与，但导致期权行权过晚；若卖方无法承诺时机，竞拍者主动发起拍卖可提高福利。
This paper endogenizes auction timing and initiation in auctions of real options. Because bidders have information rent, a seller faces a “virtual strike price” higher than the actual exercise cost. The seller inefficiently delays the auction to encourage bidder participation and uses the irreversible nature of time to gain partial control over option exercises. The seller’s private benefit at option exercise may restore efficient auction timing, but option exercises are always inefficiently late. When the seller lacks commitment to auction timing, bidders always initiate in equilibrium, resulting in earlier option exercise and higher welfare than auctions proscribing bidder initiation. Overall, auction timing modifies the distribution of the bidder valuations and has important implications for bidding strategies, auction design, and real outcomes. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.