Optimal disclosure decisions when there are penalties for nondisclosure
研究了卖方在面临不披露资产价值估计将承担损害赔偿责任时，如何决定是否披露该估计，发现更高的损害赔偿倍数或更高的被查获概率会减少披露频率，而更精确的估计则促使卖方出售更大比例的资产。
We study a seller of an asset who is liable for damages if the seller fails to disclose to buyers an estimate of the asset's value he knew prior to the sale. Our results include as either the “damages multiplier” that determines the size of the damages the seller must pay buyers increases, or as the probability the seller is caught withholding his estimate from buyers increases, the seller discloses his estimate less often, and as the precision of the seller's estimate increases, he sells a larger fraction of the asset.