Strong contracts: the relationship between power and action
通过国防领域应用开发外包案例，研究发现强势预防性合同可能阻碍供应商与买方合作，导致需求不完整时项目失败，对管理外包合同有实践启示。
Purpose There is a view that strong preventative contracts are essential to control supplier opportunism and delivery during an outsourcing implementation. The purpose of this paper is to test the proposition that contractual project environments, typical of outsourcing engagements, are essentially conflictual and that context and circumstance can act to overwhelm formal contractual and project control and lead to poor outcomes. Design/methodology/approach The paper reports on a supply case study focussed on the outsourced delivery of an application development in the defence sector. Data were gathered by a participant observation in situ for a period of three years. A grounded analysis from observations, diaries, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, documentary analysis, and e-mails was carried out with six case organisations within the extended supply chain. Findings Collaboration between suppliers and buyers can be blocked by preventative fixed price contracts and as a result when requirements are incomplete or vague this adversely impacts success. Practical implications Strong contractual control focussed on compliance may actually impede the potential success of outsourcing contracts especially when collaborative approaches are needed to cope with variability in demand. Originality/value The research raises the important practical and conceptual notion that an outsourcing can be a conflictual inter-firm phenomenon especially where multiple actors are involved and business uncertainty is present.