Firm reputation and investment decisions: The contingency role of securities analysts' recommendations
研究发现高声誉企业因预防导向而偏好低风险投资，且分析师负面推荐会强化这一效应，挑战了声誉仅带来资源优势的传统观点。
Moving beyond resource-based consequences of a firm's reputation, we develop a behavioral perspective on the impact of corporate reputation. Although there has been extensive discussion in previous studies of the benefits of reputation in terms of gaining resource advantages, we apply theory on self-regulatory focus to suggest that highly reputable firms may tend to have a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus in their investment strategies. This tendency will lead the firm to opt for low-risk investments rather than high-risk investments. Furthermore, we develop a contingency model and argue that the main effect of reputation on the investment decisions of the firm is further strengthened by the negative recommendations of securities analysts. We find support for our hypotheses. In doing so, we address emerging theories about the potential negative consequences of a firm's reputation and provide important insights for our theoretical understanding of the behavior of highly reputable firms.