Moral Hazard Versus Liquidity and the Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits
提出一种新方法，仅从失业救济金变化对求职率的影响中识别流动性和道德风险效应，并推导最优救济金水平的充分统计量公式。基于西班牙1992-2012年数据，发现道德风险效应占主导，表明当时救济金水平过高。
Abstract We develop a novel way of identifying the liquidity and moral hazard effects of unemployment insurance exclusively from how job-finding rates respond to unemployment benefits that vary over an unemployment spell. We derive a sufficient statistics formula for the dynamically optimal level of unemployment benefits based on these two effects. Using a regression kink design (RKD) that simultaneously exploits two kinks in the schedule of unemployment benefits, we apply our method to Spain for the years 1992–2012 and find that moral hazard effects dominated liquidity effects, suggesting that Spanish unemployment benefits exceeded the optimal level in that period.