Post‐crisis reforms in banking: Regulators at the interface between domestic and international governance
本文提出一个分析框架，解释为何危机后国际银行业标准在资本、流动性等领域达成一致，但在银行结构领域未能实现，聚焦美国与欧盟监管者在国际标准制定中的不同角色。
Abstract Post‐crisis international standards have been agreed on in certain areas of banking regulation, namely capital, liquidity, and resolution, but not others, namely bank structure – why? We articulate a two‐step analytical framework that links the domestic and international levels of governance. In particular, we focus on the role of domestic regulators at the interface between the two levels. At the domestic level, regulators evaluate externalities and adjustment costs before engaging in cooperation at the international level. This analysis explains why regulators in the United States and the European Union act as pacesetters, foot‐draggers, or fence‐sitters in international standard setting; that is to say, why they promote, resist, or are neutral toward international financial standards. At the international level, we explain the outcome of international standard setting by considering the interaction of pacesetters and foot‐draggers.