Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets
研究了商业医疗市场中窄网络的后果，通过讨价还价模型模拟不同网络下的均衡结果，发现私人排除激励超过社会激励，禁止排除的监管会提高价格和保费，降低消费者福利，但可能保护靠近被排除医院的消费者。
We evaluate the consequences of narrow hospital networks in commercial health care markets. We develop a bargaining solution, “Nash-in-Nash with Threat of Replacement,” that captures insurers’ incentives to exclude, and combine it with California data and estimates from Ho and Lee (2017) to simulate equilibrium outcomes under social, consumer, and insurer-optimal networks. Private incentives to exclude generally exceed social incentives, as the insurer benefits from substantially lower negotiated hospital rates. Regulation prohibiting exclusion increases prices and premiums and lowers consumer welfare without significantly affecting social surplus. However, regulation may prevent harm to consumers living close to excluded hospitals.