Divergence of Cash Flow and Voting Rights, Opacity, and Stock Price Crash Risk: International Evidence
研究了全球20个国家1995-2007年间双重股权结构公司中，现金流权与投票权分离程度如何影响股价崩盘风险，发现分离度越大且信息越不透明的公司崩盘风险越高，而外部监督和增长机会能缓解此效应。
ABSTRACT This study investigates whether and how the deviation of cash flow rights (ownership) from voting rights (control), or simply the ownership‐control wedge, influences the likelihood that extreme negative outliers occur in stock return distributions, which we refer to as stock price crash risk. We do so using a comprehensive panel data set of firms with a dual‐class share structure from 20 countries around the world for the period of 1995–2007. We predict and find that opaque firms with a large wedge are more crash prone than opaque firms with a small wedge. In addition, we predict and find that the positive relation between the wedge and crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more effective external monitoring and for firms with greater growth opportunities. The results of this study are broadly consistent with Jin and Myers’s theory that agency costs, combined with opacity, exacerbate stock price crash risk.