CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud
研究发现CEO通过任命决策与高管和董事建立的关联会增加公司欺诈风险，降低欺诈被发现的概率，并帮助掩盖欺诈行为，使CEO更不易被解雇。
ABSTRACT We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.