Can Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada
研究内华达州宽松公司法对股东价值的影响，发现对自我选择进入该州的小公司（尤其是机构持股低、内部人持股高的公司）无害甚至有益，可能因降低收购和诉讼成本。
Recent scholarship argues that Nevada’s lax corporate law, which exempts managers from fiduciary duties and discourages takeovers, may harm shareholders’ wealth. I present evidence that Nevada corporate law does not harm shareholder value for firms that self-select into Nevada, particularly small firms with low levels of institutional shareholding and high levels of insider ownership, and it may in fact enhance the value of these firms. A possible explanation is that Nevada’s promanagerial laws reduce the likelihood of takeovers and litigation, thereby benefiting a segment of small firms for which the costs of corporate governance may outweigh the benefits.