Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting
研究央行在面临时间不一致问题时，选择单一目标（通胀目标或汇率盯住）的倾向，发现央行可信度越低、经济越开放，越可能选择汇率盯住。
Abstract Adopting a single instead of multiple targets can be an effective way to overcome the classic time‐inconsistency problem. The choice of a single mandate depends on the trade openness and the credibility. Reduced‐form empirical results show as central banks become less credible, they are more likely to adopt a pegged exchange rate, and the tendency to peg depends on trade openness. In a model with “loose commitment,” as credibility falls, either an inflation target or a pegged exchange rate is more likely to be adopted. A relatively closed (highly open) economy would adopt an inflation target (exchange rate peg).