Designing Incentive Systems for Truthful Forecast Information Sharing Within a Firm
研究企业内销售部门与运营部门之间的需求预测信息共享问题，通过引入预测误差惩罚和考虑行为因素，设计激励系统以促进真实信息共享，并通过实验室实验验证模型有效性。
We consider a firm where the sales division (Sales) is responsible for demand forecasting and the operations division (Operations) is responsible for ordering. Sales has better information about the demand than Operations and sends a nonbinding demand forecast to Operations. To incentivize truthful information sharing, we include a forecast error penalty in the incentive system of Sales. Besides monetary payoffs, we also add behavioral factors to the utility function of Sales. We model the setting as a signaling game and derive the Pareto-dominant separating equilibria of the game. In laboratory experiments, we observe human behavior that is in line with the predictions of the behavioral model but deviates substantially from expected-payoff-maximizing behavior. We use the behavioral model to design incentive systems for truthful information sharing and validate the approach in an experiment with out-of-sample treatments and out-of-sample subjects. We conduct additional experiments to provide further robustness to the results. The experimental data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2805 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management.