Does Information Asymmetry Affect Corporate Tax Aggressiveness?
研究发现，分析师覆盖减少（信息不对称增加）后，企业更激进地避税，尤其在已有避税能力、初始分析师少、同行少的企业中更明显。
We investigate the effect of information asymmetry on corporate tax avoidance. Using a difference-in-differences matching estimator to assess the effects of changes in analyst coverage caused by broker closures and mergers, we find that firms avoid tax more aggressively after a reduction in analyst coverage. We further find that this effect is mainly driven by firms with higher existing tax-planning capacity (e.g., tax-haven presence), smaller initial analyst coverage, and a smaller number of peer firms. Moreover, the effect is more pronounced in industries where reputation matters more and in firms subject to less monitoring from tax authorities.