Politically Feasible Reforms of Nonlinear Tax Systems
从政治经济学角度研究非线性所得税制度的改革，提出单调税收改革的中位数选民定理，并通过美国数据验证改革单调性及中位数选民支持与多数支持的一致性，最后给出检验改革政治可行性的充分统计量。
We study reforms of nonlinear income tax systems from a political economy perspective. We present a median voter theorem for monotonic tax reforms, reforms so that the change in the tax burden is a monotonic function of income. We also provide an empirical analysis of tax reforms, with a focus on the United States. We show that past reforms have, by and large, been monotonic. We also show that support by the median voter was aligned with majority support in the population. Finally, we develop sufficient statistics that enable to test whether a given tax system admits a politically feasible reform.