Do Co‐Opted Directors Influence Dividend Policy?
研究发现，由现任CEO任命后的董事（即被任命的董事）会降低公司支付股利的倾向和金额，其解释力强于传统的董事会独立性指标，且利用萨班斯-奥克斯利法案作为自然实验表明该影响更可能是因果关系。
Abstract We explore how co‐opted directors affect dividend policy. Co‐opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) assumes office. Our results show that co‐opted directors lead to a weaker propensity to pay dividends and, for dividend‐paying firms, significantly lower dividend payouts. We also show that board co‐option has more explanatory power for dividend policy than does the traditional measure of board effectiveness, that is, board independence. Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act as a natural experiment, we show that the effect of board co‐option on dividend policy is more likely causal, rather than merely an association.