Platform retailing with slotting allowance and revenue sharing
研究了零售商向供应商收取进场费和收益分成时可能引发的渠道冲突与供应商排斥现象，通过双供应商单零售商模型分析了市场大小差异和产品替代性的驱动作用。
This paper investigates a type of platform retailing, where the retailer builds up large facilities, inside which a supplier (manufacturer) rents a mini-store and sells goods directly. The retailer demands a slotting allowance and a portion of the sales revenue from the supplier; however, this fee structure may cause a channel conflict and supplier exclusion. To understand these phenomena, we build a two-supplier−one-retailer Stackelberg model with the retailer acting as the leader and the suppliers acting as the followers. We solve the model analytically and numerically, assuming competitive and non-competitive suppliers, identical and nonidentical slotting allowance, and possibly different revenue-sharing rates for the two suppliers. It is found that supplier exclusion may happen if the slotting allowance is identical across the suppliers, whereby the market size difference and product substitution are the underlying driving forces. We also provide rationales for the existence of a slotting fee.