Regulatory Spillovers in Common Audit Markets
研究发现萨班斯-奥克斯利法案对非上市实体审计市场产生显著溢出效应：短期因劳动力供给刚性导致审计费用上升和银行融资中经审计财务报告使用减少12%；长期审计供给结构转变，非营利组织审计市场集中度五年内下降超一半，供应商数量增加26%。
We find that Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) had two significant effects on the audit market for nonpublic entities. The first short-run effect stems from inelastic labor supply coupled with an audit demand shock from public companies. As a result, private companies reduced their use of attested financial reports in bank financing by 12%, and audit fee increases for nonprofit organizations (NPOs) more than doubled. The second long-run effect was a transformation in the audit supply structure. After SOX, NPOs were less likely to match with auditors most exposed to public companies, whereas auditors increasingly specialized their offices based on client type. Audit market concentration for NPOs dropped by more than one-half within five years of SOX and remained at this level through the end of our sample in 2013, whereas the number of suppliers increased by 26%. Our results demonstrate how regulation directed at public companies generates economically important spillovers for nonpublic entities. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.