Unemployment risks and intra-household insurance
研究家庭中配偶提供消费保险的能力如何影响失业者找工作的风险选择，并分析最优公共保险政策，发现失业补助应随配偶收入递减。
To study the constrained efficient public insurance provision against unemployment risks, we build a directed search model with households where a spouse's ability to provide consumption insurance determines the risks job-seekers take on. The planner's transfers to the unemployed fall with the spouse's income because of concave preferences with limited complementarity between consumption and the spouse's labor. Due to the absence of such a transfers scheme in the laissez-faire equilibrium, too many too-low-wage jobs are created as jobless workers seek insurance in the labor market. Social welfare-maximizing policies with simple tax schemes exhibit unemployment benefits falling with spouse's income, and nearly fill up the welfare gap.