BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION
研究发送者通过设计序列私人实验提供硬证据来说服接收者，发现私人实验下说服概率更低但接收者获得更高质量信息，决策质量随发送者利益提高而改善。
This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto‐dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the sender's stakes.