The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness
综述了动态选举文献，在空间偏好和寻租设定下定义平稳选举均衡，证明重复选举缓解承诺问题并实现回应性民主，但任期限制削弱这一结果。
We survey the literature on dynamic elections in the traditional settings of spatial preferences and rent seeking under perfect and imperfect monitoring of politicians. We define stationary electoral equilibrium, which encompasses notions used by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Banks and Sundaram (1998), and others. We show that repeated elections mitigate the commitment problems of politicians and voters, and that a responsive democracy result holds under general conditions. Term limits, however, attenuate the responsiveness finding. We also touch on related applied work, and we point to areas for fruitful future research, including the connection between dynamic models of politics and economics.