Corporate Social Responsibility and Market-Based Consequences of Adverse Corporate Events: Evidence From Restatement Announcements
研究了企业社会责任（CSR）在财务重述等负面事件中的信息价值，发现CSR表现好的公司重述概率更低、市场负面反应更小，且较少被集体诉讼，表明CSR可对冲风险。
I analyze the informational value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures in the presence of bad news (i.e., financial restatements). I do so by examining the link between CSR and (a) restatement likelihood and the (b) market-based consequences of restatement announcements. I find that restatements are lower (higher) for firms that are more (less) CSR responsible, consistent with the view that CSR-conscious firms adhere to a corporate culture that promotes ethical practices. In analyzing the market effects of restatements, I find that investors respond less (more) negatively to restatements by firms that exhibit strong (weak) CSR performance. This is consistent with the notion that investors perceive positive CSR performance to be in line with managers’ incentives to promote corporate ethical values than with their incentives to cover up corporate misconduct. In addition, I find that restating firms that are less CSR conscious are more likely to be named as defendants in class actions following restatements. Although I do not find that the likelihood of litigation dismissal is associated with CSR performance, I find that among the cases settled, the amount of settlements is inversely associated with better CSR performance. Collectively, the evidence suggests that firms can effectively use CSR to hedge against potential risk stemming from adverse corporate events.