Do Outside Directors with Government Experience Create Value?
研究发现，具有政府背景的外部董事更可能缺席董事会，其任命公告市场反应负面，且公司运营业绩和并购公告回报更差，但在有政府销售、受监管行业或政治关联时负面影响减弱。
Abstract We examine whether outside directors with government experience add value to their firms. We find that government directors are more likely to miss board meetings and that their appointment announcements are greeted more negatively. Firms with government directors also experience poorer operating performance and more negative merger announcement returns, although their mergers are less likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. These adverse valuation effects are largely alleviated when firms have large government sales, when they operate in regulated industries, or when government directors are politically connected. Using close gubernatorial election outcomes as a natural experiment and an instrumental variables approach to control for endogeneity bias do not change the results.