Indeterminacy and imperfect information
研究了两类信息不同的代理人如何导致均衡不确定：完全知情者观察所有变量，而不完全知情者需解决动态信号提取问题，其最优信息处理引入稳定动态，产生自我实现的预期，即使完全信息下均衡唯一，有限信息下也可能不确定。
We study equilibrium determination in an environment where two types of agents have different information sets: Fully informed agents observe histories of all exogenous and endogenous variables. Less informed agents observe only a strict subset of the full information set and need to solve a dynamic signal extraction problem to gather information about the variables they do not directly observe. Both types of agents know the structure of the model and form expectations rationally. In this environment, we identify a new channel that generates equilibrium indeterminacy: Optimal information processing of the less informed agent introduces stable dynamics into the equation system that lead to self-fulling expectations. For parameter values that imply a unique equilibrium under full information, the limited information rational expectations equilibrium is indeterminate. We illustrate our framework with monetary policy models where an imperfectly informed central bank follows an interest rate rule.