An Empirical Examination of the Divergence between Managers’ and Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
研究了管理层发布预测后分析师预测与管理者预测出现分歧的情况，发现分歧会削弱投资者对基于分析师预测的盈利意外的反应，且当管理层预测更可信时这种削弱作用更强；若分歧中管理层预测更准，分析师后续预测会更准且序列相关性更低。
Abstract We study circumstances when analysts’ forecasts diverge from managers’ forecasts after management guidance, and the consequences of this divergence for investors and analysts. Our results show that investors’ return response to earnings surprises based on analyst forecasts is significantly weaker when analyst and management forecasts diverge, and that this attenuating effect is stronger when the management forecast is more credible. When the divergent management forecast is more accurate than the analyst consensus forecast, the subsequent‐quarter analyst consensus forecast is significantly more accurate than that of the current quarter, and exhibits less serial correlation. Overall, our findings suggest that, when analyst and management forecasts diverge, investors find the two sources to contain complementary information, and analysts learn to improve their subsequent forecasts.