Credible Auctions: A Trilemma
研究了拍卖人可与竞拍者私下沟通的机制中，如何设计拍卖规则使拍卖人自觉遵守规则。发现第一价格密封拍卖是唯一可信的静态机制，升价拍卖是唯一可信的策略证明机制。
Consider an extensive‐form mechanism, run by an auctioneer who communicates sequentially and privately with bidders. Suppose the auctioneer can deviate from the rules provided that no single bidder detects the deviation. A mechanism is credible if it is incentive‐compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules. We study the optimal auctions in which only winners pay, under symmetric independent private values. The first‐price auction is the unique credible static mechanism. The ascending auction is the unique credible strategy‐proof mechanism.