An international analysis of CEO social capital and corporate risk‐taking
研究了全球范围内CEO社会资本对企业风险承担的影响，发现CEO社会资本越大，企业越倾向于高风险投资和财务政策，且这一关系受股东法律保护、金融发展和国家文化的调节。
Abstract This study examines the effects of CEO social capital on corporate risk‐taking around the world. We document a significant positive relation between CEO social capital and aggregate corporate risk‐taking. Further, we find that CEOs with large social capital prefer riskier investment and financial policies. We also determine that the effect of CEO social capital on corporate risk‐taking is moderated by the extent of legal protections provided to shareholders, the financial development, and the culture of the country in which a firm is incorporated. Our results are robust to alternative proxies of risk‐taking, alternative model specifications, and tests for endogeneity.