Properties of scoring auctions
系统分析了供应商多维私人信息下评分拍卖的均衡行为与期望效用等价性，并证明评分拍卖优于菜单拍卖、选美竞赛和最低质量门槛的价格拍卖。
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price-only auctions with minimum quality thresholds. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.