Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment
通过1200名参与者的真实努力实验，检验经典高成本投票模型的预测，发现机会成本高的人更少投票，选举规模与竞争程度影响投票率，且多数派投票率高于少数派。
Abstract We test the turnout predictions of the canonical costly voting model through a large-scale, real effort experiment. We recruit 1200 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and employ a <mml:math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mnf="http://cambridge.org/core/manifest" xmlns:cup="http://contentservices.cambridge.org" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:m="http://cambridge.org/core/metadata" xmlns:core="http://cambridge.org/core" xmlns:c="http://cambridge.org/core/content"><mml:mrow><mml:mn>2</mml:mn><mml:mo>×</mml:mo><mml:mn>2</mml:mn></mml:mrow></mml:math> between subjects design encompassing small ( <mml:math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mnf="http://cambridge.org/core/manifest" xmlns:cup="http://contentservices.cambridge.org" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:m="http://cambridge.org/core/metadata" xmlns:core="http://cambridge.org/core" xmlns:c="http://cambridge.org/core/content"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>N</mml:mi><mml:mo>=</mml:mo><mml:mn>30</mml:mn></mml:mrow></mml:math> ) and large ( <mml:math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:mnf="http://cambridge.org/core/manifest" xmlns:cup="http://contentservices.cambridge.org" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:m="http://cambridge.org/core/metadata" xmlns:core="http://cambridge.org/core" xmlns:c="http://cambridge.org/core/content"><mml:mrow><mml:mi>N</mml:mi><mml:mo>=</mml:mo><mml:mn>300</mml:mn></mml:mrow></mml:math> ) elections, as well as close and lopsided. As predicted, participants with a higher opportunity cost are less likely to vote; turnout rate decreases as the electorate size increases in lopsided elections and increases the closer the election is in large elections. However, in the large lopsided election the majority turns out to vote at a higher rate than the minority. We rationalize these results as the equilibrium outcome of a model in which voters obtain a small non-monetary utility if they vote and their party wins.