How Efficient Is Dynamic Competition? The Case of Price as Investment
研究了企业将定价作为降低成本和增加需求的投资时，动态竞争对福利的影响，发现学习效应导致无谓损失较低，但并非因为竞争均衡接近社会最优。
We study industries where the price that a firm sets serves as an investment into lower cost or higher demand. We assess the welfare implications of the ensuing competition for the market using analytical and numerical approaches to compare the equilibria of a learning-by-doing model to the first-best planner solution. We show that dynamic competition leads to low deadweight loss. This cannot be attributed to similarity between the equilibria and the planner solution. Instead, we show how learning-by-doing causes the various contributions to deadweight loss to either be small or partly offset each other.