When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?
构建理论框架分析宽大计划对卡特尔数量的影响，发现某些条件下可能反而增加卡特尔，并指出竞争当局可采取哪些政策使宽大计划更有效减少卡特尔。
Leniency programs have become widespread and are generally quite active as reflected in the number of applications. What is not well understood is how they affect the number of cartels. This paper develops and explores a theoretical framework to help understand when leniency programs are likely to be effective in reducing the presence of cartels. Plausible conditions are derived whereby a leniency program can result in more cartels. On a more positive note, we identify situations and policies that a competition authority can pursue that will make it more likely that a leniency program will have the intended effect of reducing the number of cartels.