Debt Priority Structure, Market Discipline, and Bank Conduct
利用一项改变银行资产债权优先顺序的自然实验，研究发现存款人优先权法律降低了存款利率但提高了非存款利率，且使非存款债权人次级化减少了银行风险承担，体现了市场纪律的作用。
We examine how debt priority structure affects bank funding costs and soundness. Leveraging an unexplored natural experiment that changes the priority of claims on banks’ assets, we document asymmetric effects that are consistent with changes in monitoring intensity by various creditors depending on whether creditors move up or down the priority ladder. The enactment of depositor preference laws that confer priority on depositors reduces deposit rates but increases nondeposit rates. Importantly, subordinating nondepositor claims reduces bank risk-taking, consistent with market discipline. This insight highlights a role for debt priority structure in the regulatory framework.