MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
研究卖方竞争吸引买方的市场中，见面摩擦如何影响均衡交易机制和分配，发现高估值买方聚集在同一子市场，低估值买方可能分散，且当卖方能设置保留价或入场费的拍卖时，分散均衡是有效的。
Abstract This article shows how meeting frictions affect equilibrium trading mechanisms and allocations in an environment where identical sellers post mechanisms to compete for buyers with ex ante heterogeneous private valuations. Multiple submarkets can emerge, each consisting of all sellers posting a particular mechanism and the buyers who visit those sellers. Under mild conditions, high‐valuation buyers are all located in the same submarket, and low valuation buyers can be in: (i) the same submarket, (ii) a different submarket, and (iii) a mixture of (i) and (ii). The decentralized equilibrium is efficient when sellers can post auctions with reserve prices or entry fees.