Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation
本文基于芝加哥大学斯隆会议，论证金融监管的成本收益分析在理论上比健康安全监管更容易实施，所需估值虽尚未存在但理论上可测，且监管者承诺使用后将激励经济学家提供估值，从而改善监管并减少司法挑战。
This paper builds on contributions to the Sloan conference Benefit-Cost Analysis of Financial Regulation, held at the University of Chicago, to show how benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of financial regulations should be conducted. Our major themes are that (1) on theoretical grounds, BCA should be easier for financial regulation than for other areas of regulation where it is already used, such as health and safety regulation; (2) while many needed valuations for BCA of financial regulation do not yet exist, those valuations are theoretically measurable; (3) once regulators commit to using BCA, economists will have incentives to work on supplying those valuations; (4) BCA will improve financial regulation and make it less vulnerable to judicial challenge; and (5) the specific protocols or paradigms of BCA will differ across different areas of financial regulation.