Secrecy and Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
研究企业如何在专利与保密之间选择获利机制，利用《统一商业秘密法》的逐步实施发现该法使专利数量一年后减少38.6%，且对高利润、高研发投入企业影响更大。
How should firms use patents and secrecy as appropriability mechanisms? Consider technologies that differ in the likelihood of being invented around or reverse engineered. Here, I develop the profit-maximizing strategy: (i) on the internal margin, the marginal patent balances appropriability relative to cost of patents vis-a-vis secrecy, and (ii) on the external margin, commercialize products that yield non-negative profit. To test the theory, I exploit staggered enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), using other uniform laws as instruments. The Act was associated with 38.6% fewer patents after one year, and smaller effects in later years. The Act was associated with larger effect on companies that earned higher margins, spent more on R&D, and faced weaker enforcement of covenants not to compete. The empirical findings are consistent with businesses actively choosing between patent and secrecy as appropriability mechanisms, and appropriability affecting the number of products commercialized. The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2017.0035 .