Cognitive Ability and Bidding Behavior in Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study
通过实验研究认知能力与第二价格拍卖中出价行为的关系，发现认知能力更强的参与者更符合理论预测，有助于解释出价行为的异质性，对利用拍卖推断真实价值的研究有参考意义。
This paper examines what connection, if any, there is between cognitive ability and bidding strategy in second price auctions. Despite truthful revelations being a weakly dominant strategy, previous experiments have consistently observed overbidding, which makes the use of such auctions for inferring homegrown values problematic. Examining the effect of cognitive ability is important, as it may help identify when one can reliably recover values from observed bids. The results indicate that more cognitively able subjects behave in closer accordance with theory, and that cognitive ability partially explains heterogeneity in bidding behavior. Our results suggest that considering subjects' cognitive ability in homegrown valuation studies can help identify the true underlying demand conditions.