A Rent-Protection Explanation for SEO Flotation-Method Choice
研究了新股发行中控制权租金保护动机如何影响配股与现金增发的选择，解释了配股公告的负面效应，对理解大股东行为与公司价值有参考。
Abstract We model how a rent-protection motive drives the choice of flotation method in new equity issuance between two polar cases: rights issues and cash offers. Unexpected new blockholders would emerge in control-diluting cash offers and share in jealously guarded control benefits. But rights issues help the incumbent controlling shareholders avoid control dilution and safeguard their private benefits. Under asymmetric information about private benefits, the choice of flotation method can convey information about hidden private benefits and hence firm value. Our model can explain even a negative announcement effect of rights issues, and it supports not just one but three important equilibriums.