Optimal compensation rule under provider adverse selection and moral hazard
研究了当医疗服务提供者的努力程度和能力类型均不可观测时，最优补偿规则的设计。发现仅存在道德风险时，零按服务收费可实现最优；同时存在逆向选择时，需结合按人头付费、按服务收费和按绩效付费。
Although healthcare provider payments have been studied extensively in the literature, little is known about the optimal compensation rule when, in addition to unobservable provider effort (moral hazard), the provider's ability type is also private information (adverse selection). We find that when only provider effort is unobservable, to induce the first-best outcome the optimal compensation rule requires zero fee-for-service. When both provider moral hazard and adverse selection exist, the first-best outcome will be infeasible. The second-best compensation rule entails combined use of capitation, fee-for-service, and pay-for-performance.