Time‐Varying Capital Requirements and Disclosure Rules: Effects on Capitalization and Lending Decisions
研究了银行资本和贷款决策如何响应银行特定的资本要求和披露规则变化，发现提高资本要求会降低资产风险、提高资本比率，而降低要求则增加贷款但减少核心资本。
Abstract We investigate how banks’ capital and lending decisions respond to changes in bank‐specific capital and disclosure requirements. We find that an increase in the bank‐specific regulatory capital requirement results in a higher bank capital ratio, brought about via less asset risk. A decrease in the requirement implies more lending to firms but also less Tier 1 capital and higher bank leverage. We do not observe differences between confidential and public disclosure of capital requirements. Our results empirically illustrate a tradeoff between bank resilience and a fostering of the economy through more bank lending using banks’ capital requirement as policy instrument.