CEO inside debt and convertible bonds
研究CEO持有大量内部债务时，企业发行可转换债券的倾向和条款设计，发现内部债务能抑制风险转移动机，支持可转换债券用于缓解风险转移问题的假说。
Abstract The question whether convertible bonds are issued to combat the risk‐shifting problem is a subject of debate in the literature, primarily because of the unavailability of clear measures regarding managerial risk‐shifting incentives. Taking advantage of recently developed inside debt‐holding measures for CEOs, we find strong evidence in support of the risk‐shifting hypothesis. When a CEO holds a large amount of inside debt, three distinct patterns emerge: (i) the firm exhibits a lower ratio of outstanding convertibles to total debt; (ii) the firm is less likely to issue convertibles than straight debt; and (iii) the firm devises contract terms to decrease the chance of conversion when it issues convertibles.