The Leverage Ratchet Effect
研究发现，由于企业无法承诺未来的融资选择，股东会普遍抵制降低杠杆，甚至愿意发行劣后债来增加杠杆，即使这会损害企业价值。这种不对称调整导致杠杆水平依赖于历史路径。
Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history-dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.