ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS WITH A BUY‐PRICE OPTION
研究了全支付拍卖中引入买价选择权（即卖家设定一个价格，竞拍者可选择直接以此价格购买）对竞拍行为和卖家利润的影响，发现两种拍卖形式下最优买价不同但预期利润相同，且相比统一定价能吸引更多消费者并获得更高利润。
This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal buy‐price in the second price is higher than are those in the first‐price all‐pay auction, both formats maintain the same expected profit. With an endogenous entry process, all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price can attract more consumers and ultimately reach a higher expected profit than does the uniform posted‐price selling mechanism.