Time-consistent immigration policy under economic and cultural externalities
研究了移民政策在考虑文化外部性时的动态调整问题，发现移民会支持未来更多移民，导致政策倾向于延迟限制，而本地人则通过预承诺手段（如建墙、限制政治权利）来限制移民流入。
SUMMARYDiscussions of immigration policy are typically framed in the context of their economic effects in receiving countries, notably labour market and fiscal effects. In this paper, we characterize immigration policy in a richer model where migrants are also a source of cultural externalities stemming from either preferences or the functioning of formal and informal institutions in receiving countries. While in terms of pure economic effects, immigrants do not generally have any more incentives than low-skilled natives to allow for more immigration in the future, this is not the case when accounting for cultural externalities. Therefore, insofar as past immigrants have a voice in affecting future policies, a time-consistent immigration policy entails back-loading; as natives attempt at limiting voice of immigrants in the future, the economic effects of immigration flows as well as the cultural externality they introduce. Furthermore, natives exploit any pre-commitment device to limit immigration flows, e.g. building ‘‘walls’’, limiting immigrants’ political rights, or accumulating fiscal surpluses.