Persistent voting decisions in shareholder meetings
研究了美国银行股东会议中投票决策的持续性，发现滞后投票决策显著影响后续投票，为行为经济学在公司层面的投票持续性提供了新证据。
Abstract This study examined the determinants of voting decisions in shareholder meetings, with a special focus on voting persistence. The data captured votes on managerial proposals in shareholder meetings held by U.S. banks between 2003 and 2013. The dynamic panel data were analyzed using robust two‐step system generalized method of moments estimation (GMM) with orthogonal deviations. The lagged voting decision was a significant factor in explaining subsequent voting decisions. This finding provides evidence of voting persistence. Although persistence is a prominent topic in behavioral economics, studies have tended to focus on buying, consumption, and investment decisions. Persistence in voting decisions at the corporate level has been underexplored, so this article contributes to the behavioral economics literature.