Charity registration and reporting: a cross-jurisdictional and theoretical analysis of regulatory impact
本文运用公共利益理论和公共选择理论，分析不同慈善监管制度的成本与收益，旨在减少监管低效，平衡问责与透明度要求及慈善组织从监管中获得的利益。
Governments increasingly regulate charities to restrict the number of organizations claiming taxation exemptions, reduce charities’ ability to abuse state support, and detect and deter fraud. Public interest theory arguments suggest that regulation could increase philanthropy through enhancing public trust and confidence in charities. Nevertheless, public choice theory argues that regulators seek to maximize political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and reduce potential regulatory capture.We analyse charity regulatory regimes using these two regulatory theories and the relative costs and benefits of different regulatory regimes. Heeding these should reduce regulatory inefficiency and balance accountability and transparency demands against benefits charities receive from regulation.