Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence*
利用德国水泥行业微观数据，研究卡特尔破裂后竞争对运输距离的影响，发现竞争使企业更多服务远距离客户，且运输距离随产能需求比变化仅发生在竞争而非合谋时。
This article studies competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. Using a rich micro‐level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. We find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers. Moreover, the transport distance also varies in the ratio of capacity relative to demand, but only if firms compete and not when they coordinate their sales. We provide a theoretical model of spatial competition with capacity constraints that rationalizes the empirical results.